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Regulating Labour Relations in China : 
The Challenge of Adapting to the 
Socialist Market Economy 
Pitman B. POTTER* 
L I Jianyong** 
Cet article analyse la nouvelle Loi de la RPC sur le travail, entrée en 
vigueur le 1er janvier 1995, dans le contexee historique et actuel des relations 
de travail en Chine. Les auteurs accordent une atteniion pariiculière aux 
dispositions relatives au contrat de travall et au règlement des différends. 
Ils examinent également les difficultés soulevées par l'introduction des 
conveniions collectives dans les entreprises chinoises, et par les relations 
entre les syndicats et le Parti communiste. Tout en reconnasssant, dans leur 
appréciation globale de la loi, qu'elle pourratt marquer une étape impor-
tante vers la protection juridique des droits des travailleurs, ils ssgnalent 
que sa portée réelle pourratt être amoindrie par la prépondérance de la 
politique de croissanee économiqu,, par le souci de préserver le contrôle 
politique et par des difficultés pratiques de mise en œuvre. 
This paper examines the new Labour Law of the PRC, effective Jan-
uary 1, 1995, in the light of current and historical conditions of labour 
relations in China. Provisions regarding the labour contratt system and 
dispute resolution are discussed in greater detail. Issues related to the 
introduciion of collective bargaining and to the relationship between trade 
unions and the Communist Party are also examined. In their overall assess-
men,, the authors recognize the potential significanee of the Labour Law 
* Associate professor of Law and Director of Chinese Legal Studies at the University of 
British Columbia Law Faculy. 
** Researcher at East China Institute of Politics and Law and is currently in the LLM program 
at UBC Law Faculty. 
Les Cahiers de Droit, vol. 37, n° 3, septembre 1996, pp. 753-775 
(1996) 37 Les Cahiers de Droit 753 
754 Les Cahiers de Droit (1996) 37 C. de D. 753 
as a major step towards the legal protection of workers' rights, but point 
out that its effectiveness could be undermined by the preeminent policy of 
economic growth, by concerns about political control, and by obstacles to 
full implementation. 
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Introduction 
China's transition to a socialist market economy has brought on new 
challenges for labour relations. No longer is economic production the prov-
ince of a comprehensive state bureaucratic administration. Rather the econ-
omy is increasingly dominated by an ever-expanding number of private and 
quasi-private actors, which pose new challenges for doctrines of labour 
control articulated by the Communist Party of China (CPC) and enforced 
through the state labour bureaucracy. On one hand the ideological justifica-
tions no longer exist for strict labour discipline, politically subservient 
labour unions, the absence of collective bargaining and denial of the right to 
strike. On the other hand, China's economic development (and continued 
political stability) require a tightly controlled labour force, even as the 
demands of efficiency restrict investment in working conditions and bene-
fits. China's first comprehensive labour law went into effect on January 1, 
1995, and represents the regime's most recent efforts to grapple with prob-
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lems brought on by the transition to a socialist market economy1. This paper 
will examine the new Labour Law of the PRC in light of current and 
historical conditions of labour relations in China. 
1. Foundations for PRC Labour Policy 
The Labour Law of the PRC reflects current policy priorities of the 
Chinese government, but these operate in the context of the Party's histori-
cal relations with urban workers. During the pre-Liberation period, the 
CPC's problematic attempts to mobilize urban workers into a revolutionary 
force contributed to labour policies that placed a premium on political 
control. During the Maoist period, the ideological conceit that China was a 
workers' state led to policies of material coaptation of workers, but accom-
nanied Kv the nrice of pontinueH Hisciplin^ and contrnl. 
1.1 Revolutionary Relations Between Cadres and Urban Workers 
During the revolutionary period prior to 1949, the CPC had a conflic-
tive relationship with urban workers. Initial successes at labour organizing 
in the southern cities of Guangzhou and Shanghai in the 1920s were met with 
vigorous counter-measures by the Nationalist Party (KMT) leadership and 
local capitalists2. In Guangzhou, despite sporadic strikes and labour unrest 
the Communist Party had difficulty consolidating its gains and mobilizing 
workers to accomplish its revolutionary goals. In Shanghai, the first United 
Front brought tentative successes, as the Party used strikes and labour 
organization efforts to strengthen its position, only to see these efforts 
wiped out by the Nationalist coup in 19273. In the North, the CPC faced 
similar problems. Despite active labour organizing work in the northern 
1. For an authoritative review of the Labour Law of the PRC that reviews the law's efforts 
to re-order labour relations in light of changing conditions of China's socialist market 
economy, see Guo Xiang, «Laodong fa : Weihu zhigong hefa quanyi de jiben fa» (The 
Labour Law : A basic law for protecting the lawful rights of staff and workers), in 
Gongren ribao (Worker's Daily) Jan. 5, 1995, p. 5. Also see Commentator's article 
«Conscientiously safeguard labourer's legitimate rights and interests», Renmin ribao 
(People's Daily) Jul. 6, 1994, p. 1, in FBIS Daily Report-China Jul. 12, 1994, pp. 17-18 
and WANG Yantian and Fu Gang, « A channel begins to open up as the tide of reform 
surges forward — A commentary on the passage of the Labour Law of the PRC », Beijing 
Xinhua Domestic Service Jul. 28, 1994, in FBIS Daily Report-China Aug. 3, 1994, 
pp. 17-19. 
2. See generally, CM. WILBUR, «The Nationalist Revolution : from Canton to Nanking, 
1923-1928», in D. TWITCHETT and J. K. FAIRBANK eds., The Cambridge History of 
China, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, vol. 12, Part One, 1983) 527-720, at 
541-549. 
3. See generally E.J. PERRY, Shanghai on Strike : The Politics of Chinese Labor (Stanford, 
Ca. : Stanford University Press, 1993). 
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cities and along the major railroad lines, the Party was generally unable to 
translate these efforts into successful political revolution4. These failures 
contributed to policies toward urban workers which, on the one hand saw 
labour organizing as a basis for revolution, and yet on the other remained 
circumspect about the practical potential of such efforts. 
The regulatory frameworks erected by the CPC in its revolutionary 
base areas reflected this ambivalence. In the Jiangxi Soviet for example, the 
enactment of a labour law based on the Soviet Model gave vent to two 
policy aims : improving conditions and establishing trade unions as the 
focus of the CPC s Party-building efforts, to ensure that the workers' 
movement remained subservient to the Party's revolutionary programme5. 
In the northern base areas, labour regulations were used in a similar way to 
articulate policies of improving labour conditions while ensuring disciplined 
compliance by workers to CPC policy directives through the labour union 
system6. Party doubts about the reliability of workers as political allies were 
brought home during the campaign to retake Manchuria after 1945, where 
concerns about worker support contributed to the Party Centre's decision 
to build rural base areas and in effect abandon the cities7. 
Thus, during the pre-Liberation period, the CPC s experience with 
difficulties in developing the revolutionary consciousness of Chinese work-
ers and bending them to the political needs of the Party had a significant 
influence of the Party's labour policies. As well, the gradual displacement 
of the urban leadership of the CPC and the emergence of Mao Zedong led 
to further disregard of urban issues generally and an ambivalence toward 
urban workers. By the time the CPC gained control of the entirety of China, 
a pattern of labour policy was well established that emphasized political 
control over worker organizations—control that was mandated in no small 
part by doubts about the political reliability of the urban proletariat. 
4. See generally, J. ISRAEL and D.W. KLEIN, Rebels and Bureaucrats : China's December 
9ers (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London : University California Press, 1976). 
5. See W. E. BUTLER, The Legal System of the Chinese Soviet Republic 1931-1934 (Dobbs 
Ferry, N.Y. : Transnational Publishers, 1983) at 107-117. 
6. See LAN Quanpu, Jiefangqufagui gaiyao (Outline of laws and regulations in the liberated 
areas) (Beijing: Masses Publishers, 1982), pp. 118-121. 
7. See SHAN Siyi, Zaijiefang zhanzheng zhong fengfu fazhan (Rich development during 
the war of liberation) (Beijing : PLA Press, 1991), pp. 22-23 ; Li Ying, ed., Wenhua da 
geming zhong de ming ren zhiyu (Cases of famous personalities in the Cultural Revo-
lution) (Beijing : Nationalities Institute Press, 1993), pp. 77ff ; ZHENG Xiaofeng and SHU 
Ling, Tao Zhu zhuan (Biography of Tao Zhu) (Beijing: Youth Publishing, 1992), p. 188. 
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1.2 Labour Policy in Mao's China 
Labour policies during the Maoist period entailed a combination of 
coaptation with material benefits and the imposition of political discipline 
and control. Following the general pattern of oscillation between formal and 
informal patterns of rule8, methods of labour regulation tended to shift 
between alternatives of enactment and enforcement of formal rules and 
reliance on informal Party policy directives. 
During periods of more formal regulation (1954-1958, for example), 
reliance was placed on the « labour contract system ». At that time, China's 
economy was characterized as undergoing the transition from the private to 
the public ownership, and the labour contract system was considered a 
useful mechanism for bringing labour relations in private ownership enter-
prises within the ambit of Party control. The Party-organized trade unions 
played a central role in setting the terms of collective labour contracts in 
particular, by which terms and conditions of employment were set for an 
entire enterprise. Thus, Section 32 of the Common Program of the Chinese 
People's Political Consultative Congress authorized die trade unions to 
represent staff and workers in signing collective contracts with private 
enterprises9. The Provisional Methods for Mutual Signing of Collective 
Contracts Between Capitalists and Workers in Privately Operated Indus-
trial and Commercial Enterprises (1949) promulgated by All China Federa-
tion of Trade Union (ACFTU) prescribed detailed regulations concerning 
collective labour contracts on such issues as hours of work, sick leave, 
benefits and working conditions10. Sections 5 and 6 of the Trade Union Law 
(1950) authorized the trade unions to represent workers and staff in signing 
collective contracts11. The labour contract system was also recognized in 
the Directive Concerning Signing Collective Contracts in State-Owned 
Enterprises (1953) and the Directive Concerning Signing Collective 
8. See V.H. Li, «The Evolution and Development of the Chinese Legal System», in 
J. M. H. LINDBECK, China : Management of a Revolutionary Society (Seattle and 
London : University of Washington Press, 1971). 
9. See: CHEN Hefu, Zhongguo xianfa leibian (Compilation of Chinese Constitutions) 
(Beijing: Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Press, 1980), p. 189. Also see LIN Jia, 
Zhonghua renmin gongheguo laodongfa jianghua, (Speaking of China's Labour Law) 
(Beijing: Chinese Procuracy Press, 1994), p. 66. 
10. « Guanyu siying gongshang qiye lao zi shuang fang dingli jiti hetong de zanxing banfa » 
(Provisional methods for mutual signing of collective contracts between capitalists and 
workers in privately operated industrial and commercial enterprises), in Renmin shouce 
(People's handbook) 1950, p. A115. 
11. See SONG Xiangguan, ed., Shiyong laodongfa daquan (Encyclopedia on the use of 
labour law) (Changchun : Jilin Documentary History Press, 1989), p. 364. 
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Contracts in Productive Mines (1955)12. This regulatory structure was 
aimed at ensuring improved conditions for labour, and also Party control of 
workers through the medium of trade unions. 
With the completion of Socialist Transformation, and particularly 
during the period 1958-1962, labour policy was the province of flexible Party 
directives. Workers were viewed as members of a collectivist organism in 
which there was little need for formal regulations. Informal policy edicts 
and administrative directives were sufficient. During these periods, labour 
policy presumed that workers were the masters of the enterprises under the 
ideology of socialist public ownership and there were no longer any basic 
conflicts of interests between workers, enterprises and the state. The labour 
contract system was considered a vestige of capitalist private ownership, 
and so was abolished13. The importance of political control over workers 
remained, however, and during the Cultural Revolution competing factions 
issued conflicting rules on worker participation in the movement14. 
Chinese labour policies were articulated in several constitutions 
enacted between 1954 and 1982. The 1954 Constitution articulated worker 
rights to employment, improved working conditions and wages, rest (xiuxi), 
sick and retirement pay and other benefits15. The so-called « Cultural Revo-
lution» Constitution of 1975 enshrined a right to strike without making 
reference to labour discipline, while the 1978 Constitution reflected the 
post-Mao reversals of radical policies and added provisions on labour 
discipline16. The 1982 Constitution deleted the right to strike altogether17. 
These varying approaches to labour relations reflected conclusions 
about class struggle held by contending elements of the CPC elite18. At one 
end of the spectrum were views associated with Liu Shaoqi and Peng Zhen, 
who had concluded as early as 1956 that class struggle was no longer a 
problem and the emphasis should shift to developing China's productive 
12. See Zhonghua renmin gongheguo fagui xuanbian (Compilation of laws and regulations 
of the PRC), 1954, 1956. 
13. See LEE Lai To, Trade Unions In China (Singapore : Singapore University Press, 1986), 
p. 111. 
14. See generally, H.Y. LEE, The Politics of the Chinese Cultural Revolution (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1978) at 129-139. 
15. See 1954 Constitution Articles 91-93, in CHEN Hefu, op. cit., fn. 9, p. 233. 
16. See J.A. COHEN, «China's Changing Constitution», in 76 China Quarterly, 794-841 
(1978). 
17. See 1982 PRC Constitution (Beijing : Foreign Languages Press, 1983), art. 42-44. 
18. See P. VAN NESS and S. RAICHUR, « Dilemmas of Socialist Development : An Analysis 
of Strategic Lines in China, 1949-1981 », ,n BULLETIN OF CONCERNED ASIAN SCHOLARS, 
ed., China From Mao to Deng : The Politics and Economic of Socialist Development 
(Armonk, N.Y. : M.E. Sharpe, 1983) at 77-89. 
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forces—entailing greater emphasis on labour discipline. Radical views 
associated with Mao Zedong on the other hand held that class struggle 
would continue for a long time and insisted that worker rights be given 
priority over obligations concerning labour discipline and productivity. 
Despite these differences however, the theme of political domination con-
tinued, and resulted in what has been termed a neo-Confucian relationship 
of patronage and control between workers and unit leaders19. 
2. Transition to a Market Economy 
China's transition to a socialist market economy is ongoing and likely 
will continue to evolve significantly in the future. During the first fifteen or 
so years of reform, three distinct phases can be identified : (i) an initial phase 
of market liberalization, (H) an acceleration phase during which price 
reforms were central, and (iii) a privatization phase during which the role of 
state enterprises has been transformed dramatically. 
2.1 Initial Efforts at Reform 
The economic reform programs initiated following the 3rd Plenum of 
the 11th Central Committee in 1978 were tentative at first, but soon moved 
beyond the confines of either the Maoist or Soviet models that had in-
fluenced China previously20. Key to this was the political re-emergence of 
those who emphasized the decline of class struggle and the need to focus on 
productive forces21. For with the end of class struggle, the Party/state need 
no longer concern itself with resolving the problem of exploitation, and 
could recognize greater degrees of autonomy by individuals and groups in 
the economy. Thus contracts, business firms, and labour relations all could 
be directed not by the Party/state charged with eliminating and avoiding 
class exploitation, but rather by autonomous actors increasingly freed of 
state intrusion. 
These ideological changes and their policy implications emerged slowly 
at first. In labour relations, for example, little attention was paid to re-
forming the state enterprise labour system initially. Instead, the emphasis 
was placed on reforming enterprise management. Reforms in state planning 
permitted enterprises managers to contract with a wider variety of business 
partners, while the two-track pricing system permitted managers greater 
19. See A.G. WÄLDER, Communist Neo-Traditionalism : Work and Authority in Chinese 
Industry (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London : University of California Press, 1986). 
20. See generally, H. HARDING, China's Second Revolution : Reform After Mao (Washing-
ton, D.C. : Brookings Institution, 1987). 
21. See «Communique of the Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee», in Hongqi 
(Red Flag) no. 1, 1979, p. 14. 
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flexibility in obtaining production inputs22. Regulations were enacted to 
strengthen the autonomy of factory managers from interference by Party 
secretaries23. Thus the initial policy focus was on increasing the efficiency 
and productivity of state enterprises, with little attention paid to reforming 
relations between state enterprises and their workers. In labour relations, 
the neo-Confucian patrimonial relationship continued. 
However, in an effort to address the employment problem for an 
increasing number of migrant workers—primarily young people seeking 
work outside their assigned residence (hukou) location (often these were 
Cultural Revolution youth who were returning to the cities after having been 
sent down to rural areas, or peasants seeking escape from the drudgery of 
village life), the government enacted rules on contract labour. The 1986 
Regulations on Administraiion of Labour Contracts by State Enterprises 
permitted state enterprises to hire occasional workers without actually 
incorporating them into the enterprise work unit and providing the standard 
array of accompanying benefits24. The labour contracts executed under 
these rules were generally not available to workers already formally 
assigned to the enterprise, and in view of the lower level of benefits available 
under them were not considered desirable. 
Even though labour contracts formed pursuant to the 1986 Regulations 
were essentially « gap-fillers » for workers who were not already part of 
state enterprise system, the new measures did encourage the gradual emer-
gence of a somewhat free labour market25. Even as unskilled workers began 
to do contract labour in areas of construction and goods transport—to the 
extent of reducing the staff needs and costs of state enterprises, skilled 
workers began to find ways to secure their release from former employers 
to gain more remunerative employment. This was, despite the resistance of 
state enterprise employers who were often unwilling to freely release their 
skilled workers to seek higher paid employment. Employment agencies 
22. For a review of Chinese economic policies and conditions in the 1980s, see JOINT 
ECONOMIC COMMITTEE OF U.S. CONGRESS, China's Economy Looks Toward the Year 
2000 (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986). 
23. See «Zhongguo renmin gongheguo quanmin suo you zhi gongye qiye fa» (Law of the 
PRC on Enterprises Owned by the Whole People), in STATE COUNCIL LEGAL AFFAIRS 
BUREAU, ed., Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xinfagui huibian (Compilation of new PRC 
laws and regulations) 1988, n° 1 (Beijing: Xinhua, 1988), p. 27. 
24. See « Guoying qiye shixing laodong hetong zanxing guiding » (Provisional regulations 
for implementation of labour contracts by state enterprises), in SONG Xiangguan, op. 
cit., fn. 11, p. 58. Also see generally, H. K. JOSEPHS, Labour Law in China : choice and 
responsabiliy (Salem, N.H. : Butterworths, 1990). 
25. See J. HOWELL, China Opens its Doors: The Politics of Economic Transition (Boulder, 
Colo. : Lynne Rienner, 1993) at 209-243. 
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began to spring up which would serve as « headhunters » for firms seeking 
to hire skilled workers and professionals and arrange payment of the release 
fee demanded by state enterprises as the price of releasing their staff 
members to other units. As well, the sidewalk labour markets became an 
increasingly important source of unskilled workers being hired for short-
term projects. In sum, the initial reforms culminated in the emergence of a 
proto-market for labour. 
2.2 Accelerated Reform 
By the late 1980s, many of the initial reforms had run their course. 
Enterprise managers were increasingly independent, production inputs and 
outputs were gradually being freed of state regulatory constraints, and 
labour was becoming more widely available under the labour contract 
system. Taking the decision to push reforms one step further, the govern-
ment embarked on a risky and controversial course of price reform—per-
mitting commodity prices to respond to market forces instead of state 
planning mandates26. This meant that while there was little adjustment in the 
output quotas demanded of state enterprises, production inputs were sub-
ject to ever-increasing prices. The dilemmas for enterprise brought on by the 
problem of price spiralling often resulted in reduced benefits to industrial 
workers. For those workers formally attached to state enterprises, this 
meant that bonuses were cut back or eliminated, forced purchasing of state 
bonds was enforced, upgrading of worker facilities was postponed or can-
celled, and general working conditions declined27. While much attention 
was focused on the role of unemployed itinerant workers in the demonstra-
tions, factory workers formally attached to state enterprises were also 
extremely active. 
For contract workers, the results of price reform were two-fold. In 
many cases labour contracts were cancelled or not renewed—thus render-
ing large numbers of workers unemployed. Yet these workers were often 
unable to return to the rural villages from whence they had come : these 
areas had adjusted to the migrant labourers' absence, there was no work for 
them to do and moreover their families remained dependent on their remis-
sions of money from the cities. The result was increasing numbers of 
26. For a general review of the late stages of reform and many of the attendant consequences, 
see JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE OF U.S. CONGRESS, China's Economic Dilemmas in 
the 1990s : The Problems of Reforms, Modernization, and Interdependence (Washington, 
D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991). 
27. See K. HARTFORD, «The Political Economy Behind Beijing Spring», in T. SAICH, ed., 
The Chinese People's Movement: Perspectives on Spring 1989 (Armonk, N.Y. : 
M.E. Sharpe, 1990) at 50-82. 
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unemployed labourers wandering the streets of major cities in search of 
work. A second consequence was that when short term labour contracts 
were available, the terms were even more unfavourable that had been the 
case previously. In the employers' market that dominated at the time, 
itinerant labourers had little bargaining power and the inflation resulting 
from price reform was reducing the ability of employers to offer generous 
compensation and benefits under these labour contracts. The participation 
of urban workers in the democracy demonstrations of Spring 1989 provided 
ample testimony to the extent of dissatisfaction. 
The Chinese government's response was indicative of its concern over 
worker unrest. A vigorous campaign was launched of discipline and control 
over urban workers that saw public executions of workers accused of 
participating in the democracy demonstrations dominate the Chinese public 
media throughout much of 1989. Indeed, the harshest punishments were 
reserved for worker demonstrators, particularly in comparison to the rela-
tively lenient treatment of intellectuals and students. Repression was also 
directed at attempts to form independent labour unions, as labour orga-
nizers such as Han Dongfang were arrested and harassed28. 
2.3 Privatization and the Socialist Market Economy 
A third stage of reform has emerged following Deng Xiaoping's South-
ern Tour (Nanxun) in 1992. Responding to Deng's call for accelerated and 
expanded economic reform, increased attention has been paid to privatiza-
tion of Chinese enterprises. While debate continues over the extent of true 
privatization in the Chinese economy—particularly in light of the evidence 
that many so-called private enterprises are in fact owned and operated by 
local government agencies—, it is clear that the structure of enterprise 
control has changed29. Transformation of state enterprises through securiti-
zation has been accompanied by policies approving expansion of the village 
and township enterprise sector and the development of private enterprises 
limited by shares in urban areas30. Enterprises now respond to the local 
interests of corporatist elites who embody both the economic determinism 
of business managers with the political power of Party cadres. Along with 
local corporatism has come greater attention to efficiency and reduced 
production costs, which in turn has contributed to continued declines in 
28. See « China : New Arrests Linked to Worker Rights », in Human Rights Watch/Asia, 
Mar. 11, 1994. 
29. See A.G. WÄLDER, « China's Transitional Economy : Interpreting Its Significance », 144 
China Quarterly, 963-979 (1995). 
30. For a collection of insightful articles on the latest stages of the reform process, see the 
special issue of the China Quarterly on China's transitional economy, December 1995. 
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labour conditions for industrial workers31. In response to these concerns, 
the Chinese government has re-emphasized long-standing regulations on 
worker health and safety, and in some instances issued new regulations32. 
In addition, new rules have been enacted governing reporting on worker 
accidents and injuries, in the hope that increased reporting requirements 
would induce greater compliance with health and safety regulations33. 
Unfortunately, enforcement of these regulations has been problematic 
and as a result increased worker unrest has become a major challenge for 
Chinese labour policy. Between 1986 and 1994,60,000 labour disputes were 
recorded (probably matched by a sizeable number of unreported disputes), 
and 3,000 labour disputes were noted during first three months of 1994 
alone34. The upsurge of labour disputes has been accompanied by renewed 
attempts to establish autonomous workers federations : e.g. the Beijing 
Workers Autonomous Federation and the China Workers Autonomous 
Federation35. While these events have been dismissed by the PRC Labour 
Ministry as an « inevitable » component of economic modernization, the 
matter is clearly a source of concern—particularly in light of the Tianan-
men experience36. 
The Chinese government's labour policies are caught in a dilemma of 
conflicting imperatives. Economic reform and the privatization (or at least 
corporatization) of production enterprises would appear to justify granting 
greater rights to workers in the areas of collective bargaining, work stop-
pages, and so on. Yet the regime also faces the need for continued economic 
growth, which mandates greater control over worker discipline even as it 
permits declining conditions of employment. The PRC Labour Law repre-
sents the regime's effort to address these issues. 
31. See Generally, M. C.F. GAO, «On the sharp end of China's economic boom—migrant 
workers», in China Rights Forum, Spring 1994, pp. 12-13, 27; Liu Ping, «Dying for 
Development», in China Rights Forum, Fall, 1994, pp. 14-15, 27. 
32. For a review, see SONG Xiangguan, op. cit., fn. 11, pp. 128-205. 
33. See e.g. « Qiye zhi gong shangwang shigu baogao he chuli guiding » (Regulations on the 
reporting and resolution of injuries and accidents involving enterprise workers and staff), 
in XlN Shanyin and YE Xiaoli, ed., Xinbian changzhang jingli shiyong jinjifalu quanshu 
(Newly compiled compendium of practical economic laws for factory directors and 
managers) (Beijing : Procuracy Press, 1993), p. 1787. 
34. See «Labour Minister: Strikes «inevitable» with reform» (Hong Kong, AFP, Jul 15, 
1994), in FBIS Daily Report-China July 15, 1994, pp. 12-13. 
35. See B. GILLEY, « Shen Yuan Escapes 27 Jul », in Eastern Express (HK) Aug. 9, 1994, in 
FBIS Daily Report-China Aug. 9, 1994, pp. 18-19; B. GILLEY, «Further on Labor 
Activist», in Eastern Express (HK) Aug. 9, 1994, in FBI Daily Report-China Aug. 9, 
1994, p. 19. 
36. Supra, fn. 34. 
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3. An Overview of China's New Labour Law 
The Labour Law of the PRC was enacted at the 8th session of the 
Standing Committee of the 8th National People's Congress July 5,1994, and 
went into effect January 1,199537. The law went through a tortuous drafting 
process, involving thirty drafts since Deng Xiaoping first proposed drafting 
such a law during a 1978 central work conference38. While the delay re-
vealed the extent to which managing labour relations is an essential basis for 
the distribution of patronage within China's hierarchical and vertically 
integrated administrative systems, the enactment of the legislation revealed 
the extent of consensus that workers presented a fundamental source of 
tension in the course of the transition from the planned to the market 
economy. The final draft was pushed through in response to obvious chal-
lenges resulting form changing ownership conditions of enterprises39. While 
private enterprises and foreign invested enterprises were the primary source 
of concern initially40, state-owned and cooperative enterprises are also 
targeted41. 
3.1 Basic Principles 
The PRC Labour Law extends a number of specific benefits to work-
ers. These include « guarantees » respecting equal opportunity in employ-
ment, job selection, compensation, rest, leave, safety and health care, voca-
tional training, social security and welfare, and the right to submit disputes 
to arbitration. Hiring units are required to fulfill various labour require-
ments in the areas of hours of employment, rest, leave, worker safety, health 
care and protection for female and juvenile workers. Juxtaposed to these 
benefits are a number of obligations that workers must honour, including 
the duties to fulfill work requirements, improve vocational skills, carry out 
work safety and health regulations, observe labour discipline and vocational 
ethics. The law also contains various enforcement provisions, by which 
37. All references to the Labour Law of the PRC are to the text in China Law and Practice, 
August 29, 1994, pp. 21-36. 
38. See WANG Yantian and Fu Gang, loc. cit., fn. 1, 17-18. 
39. See « Labour Law should be adopted soon », Xinhua Domestic Service Jun 30, 1994, in 
FBIS Daily Report-China, July 1, 1994, p. 21. 
40. See ZHANG Xia, «Foreign-funded ventures in China told to unionize», in China Daily 
Jul. 15, 1994, p. 4, in FBIC Daily Report-China Jul 15, 1994, pp. 20-21, wherein labour 
abuses by foreign investment enterprises (usually Hong Kong owned or managed) are 
cited as the reason for increased attention to labour conditions. See also supra, fn. 39, 
and Guo Xiang, loc. cit., fn. 1. 
41. See «Offenders of labour regulations exposed», Xinhua English service July 28, 1994, 
in FBIS Daily Report-China, July 28, 1994, p. 34. 
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local Labour Administration Departments are charged with supervision and 
inspection of labour relations. 
Subject to these broad principles, the new Labour Law contains a 
multitude of specific provisions as summarized below. A range of imple-
menting regulations are currently being drafted to address these matters in 
greater detail. 
1. Labour Contract System : Following the 1978 economic reforms, 
the labour contract system has undergone a rebirth. The Labour Law 
provides rules for contract provisions on term and description of employ-
ment, labour protection, remuneration, discipline, termination, liability for 
breach and limits to the use of probationary work periods during which 
benefits may be limited. 
2. Limits to Working Hours and Overtime : Overtime pay is required 
for work in excess of eight hours per day and 44 hours per week. One day 
per week is guaranteed for rest. Approval may be obtained for alternative 
arrangements. 
3. Wages : The Labour Law establishes a principle of equal pay for 
equal work. This is intended to bring about greater gender equality in 
employment42. The state-mandated minimum wage must be taken as base 
pay. Factors to be considered in setting the state-mandated minimum wage 
include cost of living, the average wages being paid in the locality, produc-
tivity levels, and regional variations. 
4. Social Insurance System : Employers must provide for benefit 
payments in cases of retirement, illness or injury, incapacity, unemploy-
ment, child birth, and so on. 
5. Labour Disputes : The Labour Law provides institutional rules for 
resolving conflicts arising during the course of (a) contract drafting (admin-
istrative resolution of the dispute by the local Labour Administration De-
partment) ; (b) contract enforcement (resolution by an arbitration commis-
sion comprised of representatives from the local Labour Administration 
Department, the trade union, and the employer) ; and (c) disputes between 
employers and employees generally (resolution through a mediation by a 
commission comprised of representatives of staff and workers, the em-
ployer, and the local trade union, or arbitration by a commission comprised 
of representatives of the local Labour Administration Department, the trade 
union and the employer). Arbitral decisions may be appealed to the courts. 
42. There are doubts about the likelihood of reaching this goal, however. See M. Woo, 
«Biology and Equality: Challenge for Feminism in the Socialist and Liberal State», 
(1993) 42 Emory Law Journal 143 at 143-146. 
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6. Supervision and Enforcement : The relevant institutions for dis-
pute resolution include the local Labour Administration Departments, 
Local People's Governments, and Trade Unions. 
7. Inegal Liability : Employers who violate provisions of the Labour 
Law are potentially liable for compensation for harm, administrative penal-
ties and criminal sanctions. 
8. Foreign Enterprise Labour Rules : The Labour Law contains pro-
visions for foreign investment enterprises that augment regulations already 
in place. 
Of the basic issues discussed above, the labour contract system and the 
dispute resolution provisions are of particular importance and will be dis-
cussed in greater detail below. 
3.2 The Return to the Labour Contract System 
With the post-Mao economic reform policies beginning in 1978, the 
labour contract system that had been used during the 1950s was revitalized. 
After the All China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) approved the use 
of the labour contract system in State-owned enterprises in April 1979, the 
labour contract system was increasingly seen as a positive mechanism for 
improving labour conditions and enterprise efficiency43. Initially, the em-
phasis of regulations was on the foreign business sector. Thus, in July, 1980, 
the Regulations on Labour Management in Joint Venture Enterprises were 
promulgated by the State Council, and provided for individual and collec-
tive labour contracts in joint ventures44. These measures were augmented 
by the Procedures for Implementation of the Regulations on Labour Man-
agement in Joint Venture Enterprises (1984)45. 
The labour contract system was also gradually being extended to the 
domestic economy as well. At the First Session of the 6th NPC in June 1983, 
Premier Zhao Ziyang alluded to the need for greater flexibility in arrange-
ments for workers in the economy46, and the following year's CPC Central 
Committee « Decision on Reform of the Economic System » asserted the 
43. See e.g., « Jiji anpai chengshi daiye qingnian » (Positively arrange urban employment for 
youth), in Renmin ribao (People's Daily), June 7,1979, p. 3, « Ben shi quanmin qiye shou 
ci zhijie zhao shou hetong gong» (This city's public enterprises accept recruitment 
through the contract labour for the first time), in Jiefang ribao (Liberation Daily) 
(Shanghai), Aug. 16, 1980, p. 1. 
44. See MINISTRY OF LABOUR et al., Laodongfa shouce (Labour law handbook) (Beijing : 
Economic Management Press, 1988), p. 288. 
45. Id., p. 290. 
46. See ZHAO Lukuan, «Lun laodong hetong zhi» (On the labour contract system), in 
Renmin ribao (People's Daily), Sept. 7, 1983, p. 5. 
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need to expand the labour contract system47. The labour contract system 
was formally extended to state enterprises in July, 1986, with the Interim 
Provisions on the Implementaiion of the Labour Contract System for State 
Owned Enterprises®". Private enterprises were included as well under the 
Provisional Regulations on Private Enterprises ( 1988)49 and the Provisional 
Regulations on Labour Management in Private Enterprises (1989)50, which 
required private enterprises to sign labour contract with workers based on 
the principles of equality, voluntariness and agreement through consul-
tation, and which authorized the trade unions to represent staff and workers 
in concluding collective contracts. Since Deng's « Southern Tour» in early 
1992, the labour contracts system received even greater attention. The 1992 
Regulations for Transferring the Management Mechanism in the State-
Own*>si Tnftiivtrinl Siertrtrv orantpA ent*»rr»ric<»c hrr»adp r r iohtc tr< Apicrmvnp 
_
 0-~—- » . . » r ~ . u . , u „ . — — . " o — « ™ . _ » . » ^ . — 
the terms of employment through the use of labour contracts with individual 
workers51. 
China's new Labour Law requires in Article 106 that every province, 
autonomous region and centrally governed municipality should stipulate 
the steps for implementation of the labour contract system in accordance 
with the Labour Law and with the existing conditions. By the end of 1994, 
a total of thirteen provinces and municipalities had implemented the labour 
contract system for staff and workers covering in all some 40 million 
contract workers—about 25% of the total work force52. Provincial and 
municipal regulations are gradually coming into force, such as the Shanghai 
Municipal Government's Regulations on Labour Contracts of Shanghai 
Municipality (1995), which call for popularization of the labour contract 
47. See CHEN Wenyuan, « Guanyu laodong hetong de jige jiben wenti » (Some basic issues 
concerning labour contracts), in Zhongguo fazhi bao (Chinese legal system gazette), 
Aug. 25, 1986, p. 3. 
48. « Guoying qiye shixing laodong hetong zhi zanxing guiding », in Zhongguo fazhi bao 
(China legal system gazette) Sept. 10, 1986, p. 2. 
49. « Zhonghua renmin gongheguo siying qiye zanxing tiaoli », in Siying qiye changyongfalu 
shouce (Handbook of commonly used laws for private enterprises) (Beijing : Law Pub-
lishers, 1988), p. 1. 
50. « Siying qiye laodong guanli zanxing guiding », in Laodong fa yu laodong zhengyi shiyong 
shouce (Practical handbook on labour law and labour disputes) (Beijing : Chian Economy 
Press, 1994), p. 672. 
51. « Quanmin suoyouzhi gongye qiye zhuanhuan jingying ji zhi tiaoli », in XIN Shanyin and 
YE Xiaoli, op. cit., fn. 33, p. 122. 
52. See Li Boyong, « Speech at the National Meeting on Labour Work : Implementation of 
the Labour Code» in People's Daily (overseas edition) Dec. 14,1994. Li Boyong is PRC 
Minister of Labour. 
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system in Shanghai Municipality beginning in 199653. While the contract 
system is intended to bring greater discipline and control to enterprises in 
managing labour relations, to a certain extent, the new Labour Law main-
tains the systems of patronage and coaptation that characterized the Maoist 
system. Thus, where a Shanghai worker voluntarily sought cancellation of 
a labour contract in order to take a job at another factory, the original 
employer was expected still to provide severance pay54. 
3.3 Continued Importance of Party-Dominated Trade Unions 
A critical element of the new labour contract system is the continued 
role of the CPC-led labour unions under the ACFTU. Article 26 of the 1983 
Charter of China's Trade Unions passed by the Tenth National Congress 
of China's Trade Unions authorized basic level trade union committees to 
represent staff and workers to sign collective labour contracts55. This 
authorization was repeated in the various regulations on foreign investment 
enterprises and on Chinese state and privately owned enterprises. Under 
the 1992 Trade Union Law trade unions receive once again the authority to 
represent staff and workers in concluding collective contracts with enter-
prises and institutions56. 
While labour unions can of course play a positive role in achieving 
better working conditions and other benefits, the record of the ACFTU 
system is somewhat problematic. The ACFTU's primary role as a guarantor 
of Party power and a « transmission belt » for Party policies undermines its 
capacity for independent action. And since all local trade unions are subject 
under law to the overall authority of the ACFTU, there is no legal sanction 
for the creation of independent labour unions that might challenge the 
Communist Party's official policies57. In addition, recent case reports sug-
gest that the temptation to draw on worker dues for improper purposes may 
be overwhelming—raising again concerns that workers' interests are not 
particularly high matters of concern for union officials58. 
53. See Shanghai Municipality : « Stipulations on Labour Contracts for Shanghai Munici-
pality », in Shanghai Legal System, Dec. 18, 1995. 
54. See « Jiechu laodong hetong, gai bu gai fa jingji buchangjin ? » (In case of cancellation 
of a labour contract, must the compensation fee still be paid?), in Gongren ribao 
(Workers Daily), Jan. 5, 1995. 
55. « Zhongguo gonghui zhangcheng », in Gonghuifa shouce (Handbook of trade union law) 
(Beijing: Democracy and Legal System Press, 1994), p. 380. 
56. « Zhonghua renmin gongheguo gonghui fa », op. cit., fn. 55, p. 63. 
57. See generally, S. BIDDULPH and S. COONEY, « Regulation of Trade Unions in the People's 
Republic of China», (1993) 19 Melbourne University Law Review, 255-292. 
58. See e.g., «Fayuan cuo jiang huifei di zizuo susong fei» (The court improperly takes 
union dues to pay litigation fee), in Laodong ribao (Workers's Daily) Oct. 10,1995, p. 5. 
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3.4 Dispute Resolution 
The Labour Law's provisions on dispute resolution may offer workers 
a basis for appealing or perhaps avoiding altogether arbitrary decisions by 
management. In one case, for example, workers were accused of stealing 
electrical equipment and arbitrarily docked in pay—the public security 
officials being only too willing to enforce management orders with little if 
any investigation59. In another case, a worker was summarily suspended for 
three days without pay after getting into an argument with a supervisor60. 
The supervisor's superiors backed the suspension and the (reportedly inno-
cent) worker was left without a remedy. Similar incidents have been re-
ported at other enterprises61. The hope is that implementation of the Labour 
Law will impose more formalized processes for investigation and dispute 
resolution. 
The dispute resolution provisions of the Labour Law build on experi-
ments developed earlier62. Of particular importance were the 1987 State 
Council Regulations on Resolution of Labour Disputes in State Enter-
prises671, which provided for mediation and arbitration of labour disputes. 
Summarizing previous experiences, the State Council's 1993 Regulations 
for Handling Labour Disputes provided a framework for the labour dis-
putes that would later be incorporated into the PRC Labour LawM. The 
Ministry of Labour articulated the reasons for the labour dispute system by 
reference mainly to the increased numbers of labour disputes that accom-
panied enterprise reforms65. 
The primary methods for resolving disputes included mediation, which 
is to be used through the whole process of handling labour disputes. Accord-
ing to the Labour Law, mediation should be based on the voluntariness of 
both parties. Both the process and content of dispute resolution should be 
in accordance with the law and follow the principle of fairness. The Labour 
59. See « Qiye yao zijue weihu laodong zhe hefa quanyi » (The enterprise should take the 
initiative to safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of workers », in Gongren ribao 
(Workers Daily) Feb. 28, 1995. 
60. See « Zheiyang jiechu hetong dui ma ? » (Is this kind of cancellation of contract proper ?), 
in Gongren ribao (Workers Daily) Jan. 9, 1995, p. 6. 
61. See e.g. «Laodong fa shi jingying zhe you fa ke yi» (The «Labour Law» will cause 
managers to have a law to follow), in Gongren ribao (Workers Daily) Jan. 5, 1995. 
62. See D. HUNTER, «Chinese Labour Dispute Arbitration Procedures : An Early Review 
in Zhejiang Province», (1990) 11 Comparative Labor Law Journal 340. 
63. «Guoying qiye laodong zhengyi chuli zanxing guiding», op. cit., fn. 49, p. 10. 
64. See FBIS Daily Report-China Aug. 2, 1993, p. 27. 
65. See « Answers to Questions About the Policy of Handling Labour Disputes », MINISTRY 
OF LABOUR, Zhongguo laodong fa zhengce fagui quanshu (Encyclopedia of China's 
labour laws and policies) (Jilin : Science and Technology Press, 1994), p. 648. 
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Law requires that equality be accorded to the parties in matters of legal 
status, rights to apply for a mediation, arbitration or court judgment, and the 
various rights to present and explain pertinent facts in labour disputes. The 
new law requires that mediators, arbitrators and judges should be impartial 
to the parties involved and, in order to protect both parties' rights and 
interests and especially those of workers, the labour mediation committee, 
the labour arbitration committee and the people's court should handle 
labour disputes in a prompt and timely fashion. These broad principles are 
taken as the foundation upon which the various procedures for dispute 
resolution are based. 
The first step in dispute resolution is mediation through the mediation 
committee. If this fails, the dispute will go to arbitration through an arbitra-
tion committee, and possibly to the third step of litigation before the Peo-
ple' s Court. Under Article 80 of the Labour Law, the labour dispute media-
tion committee is established inside the employing unit and is composed of 
representatives of the staff and workers, representatives of the employer, 
and representatives of the trade union. The committee Chair is to be held by 
a representative of the trade union. Under Article 81, the labour dispute 
arbitration committee is composed of representatives of the local Labour 
Administrative Department (who also chairs the committee), repre-
sentatives from the trade union at the corresponding level, and repre-
sentatives of the employer. Arbitration is the first level of binding dispute 
resolution, and the prominent role of the trade union in reviewing its own 
mediation decision, as well as the absence of direct representation of staff 
and workers are particularly noteworthy. While litigation before the Peo-
ple's Courts is possible, both as a matter of first instance and to appeal an 
arbitral decision, the practical significance is minimal in light of the institu-
tional and political weaknesses of the court system in China66. The con-
tinued inability of the courts to enforce judgments against powerful eco-
nomic enterprises may render irrelevant the Labour Law's provisions for 
judicial enforcement67. Moreover, courts have been seen to lack sufficient 
expertise to permit them to coordinate dispute resolution proceedings with-
out compromising other aspects of enforcement of the Labour Law68 
66. See generally, D. C. CLARKE, « Dispute Resolution in China », (1992) 5 Journal of Chinese 
Law, 246. 
67. Guo Xiang, loc. cit., fn. 1. 
68. See « Fayuan cuo jiang huifei di zuo susong fei » (The court erroneously reduces union 
fees to pay litigation fees), in Gongren ribao (Workers Daily) Oct. 10,1995, p. 5, in which 
the court handling a dispute over investment funds improperty deducted litigation fees 
from the union membership fund. 
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4. Continuing Challenges 
While the PRC Labour Law represents an important step toward 
building an effective legal framework for protecting workers' rights in 
China, there are a number of issues remaining to be resolved. Coinciding 
with the law's promulgation were official accounts bemoaning the general 
lack of awareness and basic knowledge of the law69, and cautioning against 
lax implementation by administrative departments concerned70. In addition, 
as with other aspects of China's legal regime, the law represents a formalis-
tic expression of specific rights and obligations, but does little to serve as a 
foundation for meaningful enforcement of fundamental rights for workers. 
Official reviews of the PRC Labour Law describe it as the complete articu-
lation of the rights of workers71. In other words workers' rights are only 
those articulated in the law, and do not extend beyond the text of the 
legislation. Of particular interest are statements that the rights of workers in 
China must be based on China's unique situation, and cannot be addressed 
by reference to foreign labour law criteria72. Such an approach to workers' 
rights leaves little room for articulating and enforcing generalized norms for 
employer behaviour, or for making workers rights unconditional and inde-
pendent of various contractual duties. 
Although China's labour conditions are of course unique, two matters 
discussed by labour specialists in the PRC are of particular importance 
concerning the Labour Law, namely collective bargaining and dispute reso-
lution. The Labour Law makes reference to collective labour contracts, but 
it fails to provide meaningful protection for collective bargaining. The 
obvious unequal bargaining power between individual workers and em-
ployers has caused many to view collective bargaining as an essential 
element of modern labour law. Unfortunately, the Labour Law leaves direct 
69. Guo Xiang, loc. cit., fn. 1. 
70. « Laodong fa zhi jianshe de lichengbei » (The milestone established by the Labour Law 
system), in Gongren ribao (Workers Daily) Jan. 9,1995, p. 1 ; « Qixin xieli tuijin laodong 
fa zhi jianshe» (Make consolidated efforts to promote the establishment of the labour 
law system), in Gongren ribao (Workers Daily), Jan. 27, 1995, p. 1 ; CAO Min, «State 
vows to protect interests of labourers», China Daily Jul 8, 1994, p. 1, in FBIS Daily 
Report-China, July 8, 1994, pp. 17-18. 
71. See e.g., Ji Yanxiang, «Weihu laodongzhe hefa quanyi de jiben falu» (A basic law for 
safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of workers), in Jingji jingwei (Economic 
transit) (Zhengzhou) June 1994, pp. 30-32, 69; Guo Xiang, loc. cit., fn. 1. 
72. Id. While China claims adherence to international treaties on the rights of workers, it 
claims as a developing country that some international labour standards are inapplicable 
to China. See ZHANG Zuoyi, «Zhongguo laodong lifa» (China's labour legislation), in 
Zhengfa luntan (Theory and discussion on politics and law) 1994 no. 6, pp. 1-4 at pp. 1 
and 4. 
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representatives of staff and workers out of the contract bargaining process, 
and omits specific reference to the importance of collective bargaining. 
The power disparity between employers and employees is entrenched 
further through provisions concerning termination of labour contracts. Ac-
cording to section 25 of the Law, the employing unit may revoke a labour 
contract if the worker is « proved not up to the requirements for recruitment 
during the probation period». Unfortunately, the case record suggests that 
some staff and workers have been terminated improperly during the proba-
tion period73. Furthermore, Article 26 (3) permits the employer to demand 
and ultimately to impose revocation of a labour contract with written 
notification in cases of changed circumstances. This section has been seen 
as a a source of potential abuse, because it lacks provisions concerning the 
employer's burden of proof, and thus leaves room for employers to use 
changed circumstances improperly as an excuse to summarily dismiss em-
ployees. In contrast, while employees have the right to revoke labour 
contracts « where the employer resorts to violence, intimidation or illegal 
restriction of the personal freedom » or « fails to provide working condi-
tions as agreed upon in the labour contract », it is difficult for the worker to 
meet the burden of proof in these cases. 
The general inattention to collective bargaining to redress power imbal-
ances in the new Labour Law is puzzling in light of the fact that the concept 
has been well accepted in the PRC for some time74. Shortly after Liberation, 
collective bargaining rights were reserved for the employees of private 
enterprises75. During the economic reform period of the 1990s, several 
administrative units noted the importance of collective bargaining in labour 
relations in foreign investment enterprises. For example, the «An-
nouncement» co-issued by the Labour Deparment, the Public Security 
Bureau and the ACFTU March 4, 1994 requires that foreigners' invested 
and private enterprises should establish systems for negotiation and collec-
tive bargaining76. Apparently, despite a willingness to impose collective 
bargaining on foreign capitalist enterprises, the Chinese government is not 
yet ready to accept that the socialist market economy entails potential 
exploitation of workers by domestic enterprises to the same degree. 
73. See ZHANG Shuqing, «The employees in the joint-venture, cooperative, and foreigners' 
invested enterprises ask for the protection for their rights and interests », in Minzhu yu 
fazhifazhi (Democracy and Legal System), no. 20, 1995, p. 24-25. 
74. See CHEN Wenyuan, «Guanyu laodong fa de jige jiben wenti chusuo» (Preliminary 
inquiry on several basic issues of the Labour Law), in Zhengfa luntan (Theory and 
discussion on politics and law) June 1994, pp. 55-59, 62. 
75. See Article 6 of the Trade Union Law promulgated by ACFTU, June,1950. 
76. See PRC Supreme People's Court, Laodong zhengyi shenpan shouce (Judicial handbook 
on labour disputes) (Beijing : Law Publishers, 1994), p. 216. 
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A second major issue concerns the independence of trade unions. The 
new Labour Law entrenches the Party-dominated labour union system as 
the basic mechanism for enforcing workers' rights77. The Labour Law 
places significant reliance on the trade union in representing and safeguard-
ing the legitimate rights and interests of labourers (Article 7) in requesting 
reconsideration of termination of a contract by the employer unit and in 
supporting workers' application for arbitration or litigation (Article 30) ; in 
representing workers in concluding collective labour contracts (Article 33) ; 
in representing workers on the labour dispute mediation committee (Article 
80) and arbitration committee (Article 81) ; and in representing workers in 
supervising implementation of laws and regulations by the employer (Arti-
cle 88). However, the law contains no provisions concerning the formation 
and the structure of a trade union. The PRC Trade Union Law (1992) does 
include such provisions, but contains nothing to suggest that trade unions 
under the ACFTU will be independent. According to Article 3, all salaried 
workers are eligible for the membership of a trade union. This would extend 
to enterprise directors and managers, thus permitting those in charge of the 
employing unit to join or even to dominate the trade union in their unit. 
Moreover, the Trade Union Law also grants CPC cadres close access to 
trade union leadership. And in fact, CPC cadres have dominated the 
ACFTU since 1948, as appears from the data presented in Table 1. 
Table 1 : CPC cadres in the leadership of the ACFTU 1948-1965 8 
Number of Presidium Chairs and Number of CPC cadres serving as 
Vice Chairs Chair and Vice Chair 
1948 4 3 
1953 4 2 
1957 5 3 
1958 6 4 
1962 7 4 
1965 6 4 
The pattern continued following the Cultural Revolution with the rene-
wal of the ACFTU. The leader of ACFTU when it resumed its activities 
after the Cultural Revolution was Mr. Ni Zhifu, a Politburo member of the 
77. See « Laodong fa jiaqiangle gonghui de weihu zhineng » (The Labour Law has strength-
ened the safeguarding capacity of the unions), in Gongren ribao (Workers Daily) Jan. 5, 
1995, p. 4 ; « Jiaqiang gonghui gaige he jianshe de qiaoji » (A useful scheme for strength-
ening reform and construction of the unions), in Gongren ribao (Workers Daily), Jan. 
23, 1995, p. 1 ; Guo Xiang, loc. cit.. fn. 1. 
78. See LEE Lai To, op. cit., fn. 13, p. 71. 
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CPC79, and the current Chair of the ACFTU, Mr. Wei Jianxing, is a member 
of the CPC Politburo80. In state enterprises, almost 80% of leadership 
positions in trade unions are occupied by the Party Secretaries of the 
respective units81. Similarily, in foreign enterprises, almost all leaders of 
trade unions are concurrently Party directors of the Personnel Department 
of those units82. The close linkage between the unions and the local Party 
leadership means that aggressive union action to protect workers rights over 
the interests of the Party is unlikely83. 
Aside from issues inherent in the text of the Labour Law, a variety of 
other questions arise concerning effective implementation. Technical issues 
arise for example concerning the standards for workplace safety, environ-
mental conditions, workers' health, and similar matters. These matters 
likely will be left to individual ministries and commissions, such as the 
Ministry of Health, National Environmental Protection Agency, and of 
course the Labour Ministry. However, detailed regulations will be needed 
and trained implementation staff will be essential. 
Socio-economic problems will also complicate the problem of enforce-
ment. Of particular importance is the crisis of so-called « migrant workers ». 
Current figures of migrant workers approach fifty million, with official 
estimates of 120 million « surplus labourers » and the expectation that by the 
year 2000 China will have 200 million surplus agricultural workers on the 
non-agricultural employment marke84. These conditions have already outs-
tripped the capacity of the government to respond. Many of these migrants 
are only too happy to take factory jobs -whether in the relatively more 
secure state sector or the higher paying village and township enterprise 
sector—without regard to working conditions and legal rights. 
In the context of problems of technical complexity and the swelling 
numbers of surplus and migrant workers, enforcement of the Labour Law's 
provisions on workers' rights is hampered further by local corporatist 
79. Id., p. 146. 
80. See WEI Jianxing : « The Implementation of the Labour Law Should Highlight the 
Function of Protection», in Legal System Daily, July 23, 1995. 
81. See SHI Tanjing, Laodongfa (Labour Law) (Beijing: Economic Science Press, 1990) 
p. 257. 
82. See CHANG Kai, «Legal issues concerning the collective bargaining and collective con-
tract system in foreigners' invested enterprises», in Zhongguo Faxue (Chinese Juris-
prudence) Beijing, Jan. 1995, p. 56. 
83. For an indication of the closeness of the links between Party organs and labour unions, 
see «Sheng shi dang lingdao tan gonghui» (Provincial and municipal Party leaders 
discuss labour unions), in Gongren ribao (Workers Daily), Jan. 27, 1995, p. 3. 
84. See Li Tian, « Population flow into big cities », Beijing Review, July 18-24,1994, pp. 15-19, 
in FBIS Daily Report-China July 20, 1994, pp. 20-21. 
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alliances between administrative officials and business enterprises85. The 
economic incentives underlying local corporatist relations have even sub-
verted the financial integrity of the labour unions themselves, as cases have 
arisen where labour union funds were improperly invested thus putting 
worker pensions at risk86. Furthermore, the local CPC cadre evaluation 
system places premium on stability, production, and full employment, while 
giving little attention to strict enforcement of workers rights87. 
Conclusion 
The People's Republic of China has seen many changes in the structure 
of its economy and in the treatment of workers employed by economic 
enterprises. While the Labour Law of the PRC represents a major step 
toward articulating legal norms on the protection of workers rights, it still 
reflects the imperatives of Chinese government policies of economic growth 
and the Chinese Communist Party's concerns with political control. Thus 
provisions on contract labour and the role of trade unions appear to serve 
the interests of the Party/state to a greater extent than they do the interests 
of Chinese workers. The new law also faces significant impediments to full 
implementation. Nonetheless, in the context of the transition to a socialist 
market economy the new labour code does represent significant progress in 
the ongoing challenge of managing labour relations in China. 
85. For a discussion of corporatism in Chinese reforms, see K. PARRIS, « Local Initiative 
and National Reform : The Wenzhou Model of Development », 134 China Quarterly 242 
(1993). 
86. See e.g., «Wei han bu zhixing Gonghui fa, (Nonsensically failing to enforce the Trade 
Union Law), in Gongren ribao (Workers Daily), Oct. 10, 1995, p. 5. 
87. See generally, J.P. BURNS and J.P. CABESTAN, « Provisional Chinese Civil Service Re-
gulations», in Chinese Law and Government, Winter 1990-1991. 
